


~~SENSITIVE~~

CIA/SAVA

/WVIND 700321



## WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS

*Week Ending 21 March 1970*


**NSA Declassification/Release Instructions on File.**

*For the President Only*


~~Top Secret~~

# SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS


**1968-1970**  
weekly average  
for each month



OCTOBER 1969 - MARCH 1970  
weekly data as reported, Jan-Feb-Mar  
weekly average per month, Oct-Dec




increased to 110 from last week's 101.




Month	Day	Deaths
Oct	31	~100
Nov	1	~10
Nov	2	~10
Nov	3	~10
Nov	4	~10
Nov	5	~10
Nov	6	~10
Nov	7	~10
Nov	8	~10
Nov	9	~10
Nov	10	~10
Nov	11	~10
Nov	12	~10
Nov	13	~10
Nov	14	~10
Nov	15	~10
Nov	16	~10
Nov	17	~10
Nov	18	~10
Nov	19	~10
Nov	20	~10
Nov	21	~10
Nov	22	~10
Nov	23	~10
Nov	24	~10
Nov	25	~10
Nov	26	~10
Nov	27	~10
Nov	28	~10
Nov	29	~10
Nov	30	~10
Nov	31	~10
Dec	1	~10
Dec	2	~10
Dec	3	~10
Dec	4	~10
Dec	5	~10
Dec	6	~10
Dec	7	~10
Dec	8	~10
Dec	9	~10
Dec	10	~10
Dec	11	~10
Dec	12	~10
Dec	13	~10
Dec	14	~10
Dec	15	~10
Dec	16	~10
Dec	17	~10
Dec	18	~10
Dec	19	~10
Dec	20	~10
Dec	21	~10
Dec	22	~10
Dec	23	~10
Dec	24	~10
Dec	25	~10
Dec	26	~10
Dec	27	~10
Dec	28	~10
Dec	29	~10
Dec	30	~10
Dec	31	~10
Jan	1	~60
Jan	2	~60
Jan	3	~60
Jan	4	~60
Jan	5	~60
Jan	6	~60
Jan	7	~60
Jan	8	~60
Jan	9	~60
Jan	10	~60
Jan	11	~60
Jan	12	~60
Jan	13	~60
Jan	14	~60
Jan	15	~60
Jan	16	~60
Jan	17	~60
Jan	18	~60
Jan	19	~60
Jan	20	~60
Jan	21	~60
Jan	22	~60
Jan	23	~60
Jan	24	~60
Jan	25	~60
Jan	26	~60
Jan	27	~60
Jan	28	~60
Jan	29	~60
Jan	30	~60
Jan	31	~60
Feb	1	~60
Feb	2	~60
Feb	3	~60
Feb	4	~60
Feb	5	~60
Feb	6	~60
Feb	7	~60
Feb	8	~60
Feb	9	~60
Feb	10	~60
Feb	11	~60
Feb	12	~60
Feb	13	~60
Feb	14	~60
Feb	15	~60
Feb	16	~60
Feb	17	~60
Feb	18	~60
Feb	19	~60
Feb	20	~60
Feb	21	~60
Feb	22	~60
Feb	23	~60
Feb	24	~60
Feb	25	~60
Feb	26	~60
Feb	27	~60
Feb	28	~60
Feb	29	~60
Feb	30	~60
Feb	31	~60
Mar	1	~60
Mar	2	~60
Mar	3	~60
Mar	4	~60
Mar	5	~60
Mar	6	~60
Mar	7	~60
Mar	8	~60
Mar	9	~60
Mar	10	~60
Mar	11	~60
Mar	12	~60
Mar	13	~60
Mar	14	~60
Mar	15	~60
Mar	16	~60
Mar	17	~60
Mar	18	~60
Mar	19	~60
Mar	20	~60
Mar	21	~60
Mar	22	~60
Mar	23	~60
Mar	24	~60
Mar	25	~60
Mar	26	~60
Mar	27	~60
Mar	28	~60
Mar	29	~60
Mar	30	~60
Mar	31	~60

declined to 244 from last week's 262. The official total will change as late reports are received and will be lower than figures released to the press by the GVN.




Date	Infiltrators Detected
Oct 1-10	~1000
Oct 11-20	~1000
Oct 21-31	~1000
Nov 1-10	~1000
Nov 11-20	~1000
Nov 21-30	~1000
Dec 1-10	~1000
Dec 11-20	~1000
Dec 21-31	~1000
Jan 1-10	~4000
Jan 11-20	~5000
Jan 21-31	~4000
Feb 1-10	~5500
Feb 11-20	~5000
Feb 21-31	~3000
Mar 1-10	~2500
Mar 11-20	~2000
Mar 21-31	~1500

numbered four four-digit groups, four small "OL" groups, and one small "H" group. Acceptance of a "gap-fill" group raises the estimate for the week to over 2,200. Since 23 October, some 50,500 to 52,000 have entered the pipeline.



Month	Date	Incidents
Oct-Dec 1969		~500
		~550
		~580
January	3	~450
	10	~480
	17	~480
	24	~650
	31	~1000
February	7	~650
	14	~650
	21	~680
	28	~680
March	7	~600
	14	~550
	21	~650
	28	~650


rose sharply to 658 from last week's relatively low 526.



**ENEMY KILLED IN ACTION**

Date	Approximate Value
Oct Dec 1969	~5800
January	~2000
February	~2000
March	~2000
Oct Nov Dec	~2000
3	~2000
10	~2000
17	~1800
24	~2000
31	~2000
7	~2000
14	~2000
21	~2000
28	~2000
7	~2000
14	~2000
21	~2000

I remained constant at 2,301 compared to last week's 2,305.



Month	Effectiveness (%)
Oct-Dec 1969	45
January	45
February	55
March	55

Sacrifices for the latest week shown are preliminary.

S as measured by the percentage of enemy killed by RVN forces increased again to 56% from the previous week's 53%.

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

Enemy Activity

Although there was a sharp rise in enemy initiated activity during the week, enemy casualties remained at the same level of the previous week (about 2,300). Enemy activity was largely confined to small-scale attacks with a surge in terrorist activity in Saigon and environs. Saigon security officials had already pretty well pulled the teeth of a threatened major terror campaign in the city through a combination of good police and intelligence work.

A document captured in Hau Nghia Province, dated 11 March 1970, from the Headquarters of Sub Region 2 (SR-2 is one of the major Communist commands in the Saigon area) reinforces other documentary material which points to the need for a lower Communist military profile. The modus operandi for lowering the military presence in SR-2, according to the document, has been to break up some main force battalions and assign them to Viet Cong districts in order to operate as small, local force detachments. Small-scale operations, which will not provoke massive Allied reactions or disturb the local populace, apparently are the order of the day. The document also contains instructions for the penetration or development of organizations with "legal" status under whose cover it will be safe for the Communists to work. Loyal government officials are to be "neutralized" thereby enabling the Communists to use intimidated or sympathetic officials to control the local population and government machinery.

Enemy Infiltration

During the past week, four four-digit groups and five small specialist groups were detected and one "gap-fill" was accepted. These groups total 2,256 personnel and raise the estimate of infiltrators entering the pipeline for March to some 7,000 and the estimate since 23 October 1969 to 50,500 to 52,000 personnel. Overall, 68 four-digit groups have been detected in North Vietnam, 28 detected in Laos, and 10 are "gap-fills."

The relatively low level of infiltration input apparently will continue as recent intercepts forecast that the Communists plan to dispatch troops into the infiltration pipeline at a rate of one group a day from at least 25 March to 2 April. This schedule may be disrupted as the influenza epidemic which appeared to be on the wane in the Laotian Panhandle is on the rise again in North Vietnam, with the new outbreak reportedly more serious than the earlier one.

25X1B

Other Major Developments

On 20 March, the South Vietnamese mounted a large-scale ground and air operation jointly with the Cambodians against Communist bases and staging areas just inside Cambodia, adjacent to the Delta. The decision by the Joint General Staff to conduct the operation was precipitated by a request from the local Cambodian commander. The South Vietnamese claim to have inflicted extensive damage to Communist installations. ARVN losses were 22 KIA, while enemy losses were put at 212. President Thieu reportedly ordered the operation stopped on 22 March because of the uncertain political situation in Phnom Penh. The ARVN commander has been instructed to deny that the border was crossed and not to provide any details to Americans. No American advisors participated in this operation.

Senior South Vietnamese officials privately view the overthrow of Sihanouk with exhilaration and optimism, but they have been instructed by President Thieu to limit their public comments to expressions of support for Cambodian neutrality and hopes for better relations. The Thieu Government probably calculates that at a minimum the Cambodians will now be less likely to connive in the flow of arms and rice to the Communists and that there will be increased Cambodian harassment of the Communist forces. Thieu has said that either true Cambodian neutrality, or a strong anti-Communist stance by the new Cambodian leadership would serve GVN interests. He believes that if the Cambodians make the Communist military position in Cambodia untenable by cutting off supplies and bombing the bases, it would quickly lead to serious negotiations in Paris.

With North Vietnamese Army (NVA) elements within six kilometers of the Royal Lao Government (RLG) guerrilla base at Long Tieng, the Lao generals have decided to appeal to United States officials for more air support including B-52 raids on the NVA logistical terminal at Ban Ban. Meanwhile, the Lao Patriotic Front (NLHS) representative, Colonel Pradith Thiengtham, has arrived in Vientiane and presented the promised message from NLHS chief Souphanouvong to Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma, which reportedly adds nothing to the previously published Communist five-point settlement plan for Laos. At Long Tieng itself, the unprecedented cooperation among Lao regional commanders has increased the defending force to over 3,000 plus a Thai artillery unit. Additional T-28 support is now available from a recently completed facility at Muong Kassy.

~~Top Secret~~